METROPOLITAN GOVERNANCE, BRT AND MINIBUS SYSTEMS IN AFRICAN CITIES

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The Governance of Metropolitan Transport Systems
VREF/K2 Workshop Lund, 2019
POSITIVE TREND IN LARGE AFRICAN CITIES:
FROM HIGHWAYS TO MASS TRANSIT
BRT AS PUBLIC TRANSPORT REFORM
KEY QUESTIONS

What are the politics of BRT driven transport reform (which is linked to metro governance) in varied African cities?

Who wins? Who loses? Political power, bargaining

What are the processes at play, why and with what implications?

Are there better policy and institutional alternatives to get to high quality multi-modal transport systems than BRT driven reforms?
METHODS

• Review of existing literature

• Case studies (Lagos, Johannesburg Nairobi with learning from other cases Accra, Cape Town, Dar es Salaam, Dakar)

• Applied critical political economy and historical institutional lens to the politics of BRT with a focus on metropolitan governance in Africa
Much of the documentation is written by BRT proponents who are not independent (World Bank, ITDP in particular) and the academic literature focuses on technical issues/service quality.

Little on BRT projects as a form of power and politics and particularly on metropolitan governance that is often pushed as part of BRT projects… (Poku-Boansi & Marsden 2018)

Inadequate attention on how to engage dominant minibus systems - even though integration is critical to the functioning of BRT- (Behrens, Schalekamp, Venter, DigitalTransport4Africa, Mitullah, McCormick, Klopp, Hart, Mutongi, Khayesi et al., Rizzo, Agbiboa)
BRT is most often recommended and/or driven by external actors which activates a particular set of interests and political dynamics.

- politics of the “economic and political sublime” (Flyvberg 2014) struggle among funders and fragmentation (Klopp 2012)
- Driven by large project lending which means neglect of other modes (NMT network for example, minibus upgrading) & systems thinking
- Metropolitan governance often a product of this donor driven agenda
Bring in foreign investment and actors including bus operators to run system (Dar Es Salaam, Rizzo 2017), more interested in big project than long term planning processes

Interest in downplaying costs and needed subsidies (Harber in this paper)

Labor issues completely missing (Rizzo 2017, ITF 2018)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City/Metro Area</th>
<th>Start date</th>
<th>BRT Stage</th>
<th>Governance</th>
<th>Notes</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lagos</td>
<td>2008 (first)</td>
<td>2nd phase started</td>
<td>Created LAMATA</td>
<td>BRT-Lite, Complex bargaining with NURTW initial operator but was replaced Funder: World, AFD</td>
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<tr>
<td>Joburg</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>2nd phase</td>
<td>Complex fragmented governance- no single metro transport authority</td>
<td>Full BRT (ITDP silver ranking), more successful BRT especially the Soweto line, ongoing concerns about ridership and integration Funder: National Government</td>
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<tr>
<td>Accra</td>
<td>2016</td>
<td>BRT Stalled or faltering?</td>
<td>GAPTE (Greater Accra Passenger Transport Executive (GAPTE))</td>
<td>World Bank funded</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Addis</td>
<td>Future?</td>
<td>BRT project planning in progress</td>
<td>Addis Ababa Transport Authority</td>
<td>Addis consolidated fragmented agencies under one, implementation slow, concerns about integration</td>
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HEAD IN THE SAND APPROACH TO MINIBUSES

- focus on technical design of the corridor vs. process, minibuses as barriers/opposition
- “networks will reorganize themselves” attitude- no planning for them in design

Note most smaller African cities will not be investing in BRT vs bus upgrading (IPTN and George in South Africa)
THIS IS NAIROBI’S TRANSIT

- Power to shut down city through strike action
- Many politicians are also matatu owners (conflicts of interest) Bribes, system is seen as a way to extract value
- Political Bargaining necessary for reforms
SUBSIDIES A POLITICAL ISSUE

- Large infrastructure is an upfront subsidy
- Transparency in costs and benefits
- Subsidy could be an important lever for change
SEQUENCING: INSTITUTIONS OR ACTION OR BOTH?

- Use the big BRT project to build new institutions (LAMATA, Lagos, DART, Dar Es Salaam, South Africa, no metropolitan agencies but Joburg arguably closest to “modern” BRT)
- Use a more gradual upgrading with subsidies as an incentive to build change from bottom up while BRT in progress (MojaCruise experiment, eThekwini)
- Build institutions before BRT (Addis Transport Authority, Nairobi NAMATA)

Cookie cutter approach vs. institutional/process diversity through negotiation/political bargaining
A FEW CONCLUDING INSIGHTS

- Move away from big project focus/broaden policy imagination to look at the full sets of options, possible processes, multimodality, use data to do so.
- Study external actors as part of political economy/bundling
- Build on African experiments, institutional innovation around reform
- Build engagement and capacity especially at city/region level and incentivize cooperation and more overt discussion about institutional reform
- More cross-city learning including especially in Africa
More local research, networks and coalition building around all aspects of building multimodal systems including policy, politics and governance innovation, transparency on costs and benefits

Eg. Kenya Transport Research Network